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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)

)

Plaintiff' and
Responden,t,
vs.
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF
SALT LAKE CITY,
Defendant and
Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Case No. 18333

NATURE OF'. THE CASE
This appeal is from a final,--judgment overruling the Salt
Lake City Board of Adjustment's refusal to grant PlaintiffRespondeht-Xanthos, hereinafter "Respondent" 1 a. zoning variance.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Lower Court: admitted certain evidence not presented to
the Board of Adjustment and conduc,ted the appeal as a de novo
trial, in effect de:ny·ing the Boa>rd 's Motion iri Lirnini.

It

assumed the prerogative of :independently reweighing and balancing -interests.

The court, also, verbalized its position ·that it had

authority to substitute its judgment for the Board ·of Adjustment.
Based upon the Court's new independent findings and conclusions, judgment was entered that Respondent was entitled to a
variance from the Board.-

-This ruling·· ·legalized a structure,

believed originally to ha·ve been built as a garage, and- permitted
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•
its continued use as

B

single-family dwelling.

The Lower Court

ordered the Board to grant the variance and reimburse the
Respondent his costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant Board, on behalf of itself in this case and for
the benefit of all municipal boards of adjustment throughout this
State, seeks a reversal of the Lower Court.

Specifically, it

seeks rulings from this Court:
1.

Ruling that judicial review of Boards of Adjustment

under Section 10-9-15, U.C.A., 1953, is under the court's constitutional and statutory appellate jurisdiction and does not
authorize a trial de novo on the merits.
2.

Overturning the Lower Court's judgment by holding it

erred as a matter of law, by: (a) failing to limit its scope of_
review to determine if Board's decision was supported _by credible
evidence; (b) failing to give Board's findings and decision a
presumption of validity and impose the burden of proof to es tablish error by clear and convincing evidence; (c) substituting its
own philosophy and judgment for the Board's; and (d) granting a
judicial variance because of economic hardship, when that variance grants the site a privilege no other property or owner in
the City enjoys as a matter of right and when the effect is contrary to the spirit of zoning ordinances and public interest.
3.

Affirming the Board's decision as being adequately

supported by the credible evidence, even though reasonable per-
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sons might differ on the dispute 's resolution.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

Official Administrative Action Challenged.

1.

Respondent, Gary J. Xanthos, submitted a formal request

to the Board of, Adjustment for a. zoning variance on February 1,
~he

1979 in Board Case No. 7928.

variance requested legalization

of the use of an old structure in the northwest corner of the
Xanthos property as a single-family dwelling.
2.

(R-10, 166, .168)

When the structure in question is used as a dwelling

unit (on the same site where eight new units were constructed by
Res pond en t 's fa th er) , it lacks: frontage upon a dedicated street;
, required front, rear and side yards; minimum square footage for
the design; and miscellaneous compliance ..with City zoning laws
···applicable tQ: the site, such as parking ,''·'light and open
identific,a~tion,

access to emergency service, :and the ability. :to:.

stand as an independent building siteJC etc.
12 I

3 21

I

.3.

space,~..

3 3 0- 31 I 3 4 6 , 3.S-0 ~ Sl I

3 9 4-9 7 I

408 I

(R-255-56, 259, 311-.
418 ) •

Had;. the desired variance been< granted· by the Board, it

would have legalized the continued independent use of a small
- ·structure as a dwelling, which was probably illegally converted
from a garage and·· is now located beh&nd
duplexes.
4.

~a

series of four

(See, Exs •. 13D and 2ln,· Part 2, in App.Ex.1 & 2)
Respondent justified his request for a variance on the

grounds that the use of the structure as a dwelling was non-conforming and/or.that it existed in 197,4 when James Xanthos applied
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for and received approval to construct the duplexes, without any
requirement of record to remove the structure.

Thus, he argued

that strict enforcement by the City some four years later,
created an unfair and unnecessary hardship.
5.

(R-11).

Respondent's request was initially considered before the

Board at public hearing conducted February 26, 1979.
time, he was represented .by counsel, Mr. Rappaport.

At this
The minutes

contained in the Board's Findings and Order reflect the Board was
given background information and counsel presented his client's
case.

Neighbors, Mr. Xanthos and others offered testimony on

various aspects of the case.
6.

(R-12-3; 37-8; App.Ex.3)

After considering the testimony and evidence presented

the Board concluded the variance was not justified.

It ruled

that while the violation of using the structure as a dwelling
unit should have =been_cdiscovered

=andc-conformLty-required~at_:_ the~

time of -approval or during the construction

of-~the

duplexes, the

structure can remain and comply with applicable ordinances if it
is not used as a dwelling- (App.Ex.3).
B.

Facts Rel a ting to Construction of Four Duplexes.

7.

In 1974, James Xanthos's agent applied for and received

a permit to construct four single story duplexes, with detached
parking on 32,195 square feet of land.

The application, plot

plan and building plans were submitted to the City.
relied on said matters in granting the permit.

The City

The application

affirmatively stated that the land was presently "vacant" and
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without any dwelling units thereon.

The plat plan showed an

"existing building", but made no reference to it being a dwelling
unit.

The City approved the duplexes' building permit based on

the assumption that the structure in controversy was not going to
be used as a dwelling •.. {R-224A-226; 232, .235-6, 256, App.Ex. 1&2)
8.

Bad the· plan.·been considered as ·.one to accommodate nine

uni ts, it would have violated several applicable zoning .ordinances, including:. lack of frontage on a dedicated street; inadequate lot and. yard areas; parking; and the ability of each building-site to stand alone to independently comply with ordi'."'9
nances.

( R-2 27, 2 55-6, 29 6-7) •

9.

Nei the·r the City's nor the,,.owner 's approved set of plans

could··be·located for verification_.Qr notation··of conditions.
( R-1 4 2,

·~k

,~~ 19-2 0,

,.

2 54 ) •

.

1 O.

James Xanthos.,.proceeded·:.wi th construction-of ,the- .four ---

dupl.e~es

during the period of 1974-75; and inspections were made·:;:

by City building and,'specialty inspectors.

(R-221~4)

•.

After a

request. for a certificate of occupancy . ("C.O."). in April of 1975,
final inspections were completed.
11.

Respondent's copy of the.

(.R-23.3),.

"c.o.

's", bears no. notations of

written conditions;. although, the building inspector of, at least
one unit, Marvin Peguillan, testified that as a very new inspector, he inquired of his supervisor Mark Lawson, about the rear
building.
down.

.ffe was informed t.the old' building was going .to obe torn

(R-388)

Consequently, he signed off for the finaLd.nspec-
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tion on September 30, 1975, but made no notation on the C.O. of
the uncompleted condition of removal of the structure. (R-384-90) ·
12.

The Board noted that the violations of the structure's

use as a dwelling should have been caught or resolved during construction.

However, it did not find that the inaccurate applica-,

tion, misleading plans or ineffective resolution of zoning violations during construction constituted "special circumstances"
which attached to the property under Section 10-19-12(3) (a)
U.C.A.

It did find that the loss of rental income was not a hard-

ship justifying a variance.

(App.Ex.3, R-38; copies of Sections

10-9-12 and 10-9-15, U.C.A., 1953 are reproduced as App.Ex.4).
13.

The Lower Court disregarded the Board's finding and

rationale.

In its Amended Findings of Fact, the Court reviewed

these facts, but infers a duty upon the City to detect and
resolve ::_~zoning ·"violations· during "Plan-_review_or_ construction.
Failing that duty,--.the Court.held-the City creates:-"special

cir~

cumstances" entitling the property owner to a variance, legalizing zoning violations.

c.
14.

(Paras. 15-19, 21, App.Ex.5; R-111-13).

History of the Site.
Use of the then old-appearing structure as a dwelling

was documented back to 1942, some 15 years after City zoning was
adopted in 1927.
15.

(R-203, 215,

App~Ex.5;

R-111)

The Lower Court then found that the usage in 1942 and

the age of the structure were special circumstances justifying
the variance.

( R-113)
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16.

The structure has never been an independent residence,

according to records on file in the City.
290 and 300; cf. R-155, 252, 211).

(R-231; Ex's 210, 280,

It was and is not visible the

Street; has no mailing address, identification or access from a
public road; and had been remodeled, without permits since the
Xanthos family acquired· it in 1972.

Further, the only primary

structures approved by the City for the ·site, for which water and
sewer services were authorized prior. to construction of the four
duplexes, were removed by.James Xanthos, his.family and others
without permit.

( R-182, 207, 21 l, .321, 363-4, 369, 377 and Ex.

210 part 1, 28D and 290)

In addition, Xanthos contributed to the

confusion by deviating-from the official addresses which had been
assigned to the.;duplexes.
O.·
· 17.....

(R-318-9; 337-8)

Posit ions of·' Board and Lower Court
The Board found,, among other- things tha. t:

builder represented· that all

h~.

( 1) The

expected· t9 have on the site,

after the· construction;. was'. eight units;. ·-(2) The ordinances would
not allow, anywhere in the City, dwellings to.be constructed in
front "of others, as a matter of right; and ( 3) The gr an ting of
the desired variance would legalize and ensure the continuation
of a dwelling that does not have the required street access,
iden tif ica tion'., yard areas, landscaping, open space and other .
amenities the ordinances are intended to require and provide.
· 18.

The Board, in exercising its statutory duty to balance

the spirit and intent of the ordinances a9ainst the effect and
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the ability to comply, found the variance unjustified.

(R-13,

382-8, App.Ex.3).
19.

In its review of the case, the Lower Court disregarded

the Board's reasoning and substituted its own.

It assumed the

respc)nsibility and prerogative to independently balance the publie interest, represented by compliance with City law, as opposed
to the landowners private interests or benefits served by granting a variance.

(R-345-6; 355-9).

The Lower Court held:

"5. Plenary action relief constitutes a complete
review of the Board of Adjustment's decision by trial
de novo and the Court has the same power as the Board
of Adjustment to review the facts."
(R-113; App.Ex.5).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REVIEWING AN APPEAL
FROM A BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT DECISION BY DEPART: ING FROM.APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND CONDUCTING
A TRIAL DE NOVO. RATHER, THE COURT'S JURISDICTION·Is-LiMTTED/ UNDER -SECTION 10-9-15 ·uTA1t
CODE ANN., TO DETERMINE:
(A) WHETHER THER-E~
EXISTED CREDIBLE EVIDENCE ·To SUPPORT THE
BOARD'S DECISION, . AND ( B) WAS THE BOARD'S
DECISION. ·ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNLAWFUL.
The Lower Court denied a Motion in Limini and declined to
limit its scope of review and evidence in an appeal under Section
· l0-9..;..l5 of ·a· city Board of Adjustment zoning decision.

It

assumed the prerogative to independently retry, reweigh and
balance interests.

It candidly stated of its judicial role in

such a case as follows:
"5. Plenary action relief constitutes a complete
review of the Board of Adjustment's decision by
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trial de novo and the Court has the same power as
the Board of Adjustments to review the facts."
See Facts 5, App.Ex.5, R-113.
Said conclusion reflects the court's· erroneous decisions
that: (1) The scope of review was not appellate, but rather de
novo in nature and ·not a trial limited to .;a review of the issues
0

or evidenc·e presented to the Board; ( 2) There is no presumption
of validity to zoning administrative deci:s·ions; and ( 3) ·A ·Utah.
District Court is free to substitute 'its judgment for ·that of the
zoning Board of Adjustment, even where reasonable parties might
differ over the·' reasonableness of .. .the, ·original decision.
A.

SECTION 10-9~15 DOES' NOT·:CH.ANGE THE APPELLATE
NATURE OF THE COURT'S JURISDICTION OVER ADMINISTRATIVE ZONING TRIBUNALS NOR THE SCOPE OF JUDI.CI-AL
REVIEW.

Courts are given two types of jurisdiction under··Section 7,
.~rticle

VIII, c:>f the Utah State Constitution.

Here they are

given· appe-1-late -jur isdi-ction ·and supervisory ·control over all
inferior courts and tribunals • . This.provision recognizes that
the courts may need to utilize the common law equitable writs to
perform this '(.lppellate responsibility.
.-

Such writs, particularly

, . .J:l'

certiorari, were traditionally used to invoke the judiciary' s
limited appellate review-to challenges of abuse of discretionary
powers given to inferior statutory. bodies, where statutes do not
expressly provide a remedy for judicial review.
However, in our case a statute does exist which reads:
"Judicial review of board's decision -- Time limita-.
tion. The city or any person aggrieved by any decision
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of the board of adjustment may have and maintain a
plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of
competent jurisdiction; provided, petition for such
relief is presented to a court of competent jurisdiction within thirty days after the filing of such decision in the office of the board." 10-9-15 Utah Code
!.!!.!!.• ' 19 53.
This statute has three purposes:

(1) Require the petition for

judicial appellate review be filed timely, as a 30 day statute of
limitation; (2) Fix as an ascertainable event to trigger the
commencement of the limitation period, the date of filing the
decision in the board's office; and (3) Clarify that the reviewing court is not confined to the certified record to review the
action, but all evidence presented to the Board as shall be more
fully discussed below in Point B.
These functions were not provided under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, hereinafter "U.R.C.P.", dealing with extraordinary writs. 1 'Rather, prior --to-1972 ·and the-adoption -of Rule
8l(d), u.R.C.P., if the legislature had desired to fix a predictable short statute of limitation, it would have had to pass
such a statute. 2

Thus, City submits that the purpose of Section

10-9-15 U.C.A. was to supplement the common law certiorari
process of invoking appellate review under Rule 65(b), by estab-

1Rule 65(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 utah Chiro ractic Association, Inc. v. E uitable Life Insurance
Society o
t e Unite States, 7 P.
(Uta
exp ains
Rule 8l(d) adopted in January 20, 1972 combine with Rule 73 to
require administrative appeals to be filed within one month.
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lishing a predictable statute of limitation and allowing evidentiary proof of matters presented to the Board.

It was not to

confer a new source of o.riginal jurisdiction to the trial courts.
The respected treatise on municipal law succintly summarizes
the ~aw concer'ning the -scope of, -ap:Pella te j.udicial review of
zoning boards, including boards with power to grant variances as
follows:
."In other words, the scope of judicial review and
inquiry is limited to whether the determination of th-e
zonin board is unreasonable, arbitrar or an abuse of
discretion on the acts or 1s an illegal error. And
the reviewing court is required to consider the evidence most favorable to the decision of the ·zo.ning
authori~ies."
8A McQuillan, Municipal Corporations
§25.334 at p. 472 (Emphasis added).
Utah courts have not expressly addressed the issue on cases·
arising under a board of adjustment;, however, this court has
applied ;this same

~tandard

of limited appellate review in other

zon-ing matters; which Appellant submits should be dispositive.

A

concise summary of the.general rules applicable in review of
zoning cases has'· been rendered by this Co\lrt1 ·in the 1·979.

Here,

a 6halienge was brciught 6~ a citi~en ·group cont~sting the
administrative act of the Co.un"ty in issuing

·a· special/ 'conditional

use permit to allow.construction of a large apartment complex
after modification 6f a plan earlier

rejected~

Before addressing

specific factual issues, this Court states the· ·ruies· for -judicial
review of zoning decisions

a~

follo~s:

•tn \;:~ddressing the plaintiff's' attack upon the judgment, there are certain rules to be considered. Due to
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the complexity of factors involved in the matter of
zoning, as in other fields where the courts review the
actions of administrative bodies, it should be assumed
that those charged wi.th that respons1b1l1ty (the Commission) have specialized knowledge in that field.
Accordingly they should be allowed a comparatively wide
latitude of discretion; and their actions endowed with
a presumption of correctness and validit~ which the
courts should not interfere wtih-unless 1t is shown
that there is no reasonable basis to Justify the action
taken." Cottonwood Heights Citizen Ass 1 n v. Bd. of
Comm. of S.L.Co., 593 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah, 1979).
By so doing, the court has clearly extended to zoning administrative cases the general rules of limited appellate review.
See also, Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 U.2d 307, 358 P.2d 633,
(1961) (denial of rezoning to commercial); Naylor v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 17 U.2d 300, 410 P.2d 764 (1966) (rezoning from "R-6"
to "B-3"), Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. Engh
Floral Corp., 545 P. 2d 1150 (Utah 1976) (rezoning from ag_r icul--~

.: ___ - · - · ture-res idential to commercial).
In a case-·where issues are,-virtual-ly- identical--to_.the _one __ =before the bar, our sister State Wyoming has ruled specifically
"-·-·that·-Board of -Adjustment deeisions are presumptively. valid- andc
subject of only limited judicial review • . The Wyoming court held
that the existence of a statutory remedy or "appeal" does not
- ch·ange the· 1imlted scope of appellate review otherwise-available

by extraordinary writs in board of adjustment litigation.
Williams v. Zoning Adjustment Board of the City of Laramie, 383
P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1963).
In the Willilams case, a Board granted a variance·· to permit
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the rebuilding and enlarging of a nonconforming building, which
decision was contested.

One of the issues was the scope and

procedure for such reviews.

The plaintiff argued the court

should conduct a "trial de novo" where the court would rehear all
the·. evidence and redecide :the cas.e, on the merits, even though _. _ the
statutory remedy did not specifically mention a trial de novo.3
Judge Mcintyre noted that the powers of the court, upon
review under a statute were of the same effect as those under the
extraordinary writ process.

He rejected the plaintiffs' argument

that an "appeal" made any substantive difference in the scope of
review and explained the distinction between the process of
invokintj judicial jurisdiction over an administrative action as
opposed to the type. of jurisdiction - be it original or appel·•

~

late •
. "In these quotations the term 'ap;Peal·.•_, as used in
.
similar to §15-626, was characterized as only~··
a means of ettin the coh:.trovers before a courtj not
as an a eal in t e sense o a trans er o
ur1sdiction
rom ·one. court to .anot er,
ut simp y a erocess, under
,.the mislead~ng name of appeal, for invoking the judicial· power to. determine a legal injury complained of;
as a mode of removin the cause from an administrative
to a Judicial tr1 unal, when it 1s claimed a legal
r i ht has been denied; and as an or i ina1· a ·. 1 ica tion
to a court to exercise its
.ud1c1a
ower in res ect
to
y t e adm1n1strat1ve tr1buna 1n

~statutes

"We find nothing in the: opinion·:of Judge Riner which
would suggest that the trial in district court, on
appeal from an adjustment ·board, should be a trial de
3 section 10-9-15 similarly does not-mention trial de~·
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novo. On the contrary, it seems clear to us the decision in the Mcinerney case contemplated as the statute
does, that the court has only the duty to review for
the· purpose of determining whether the acts done by the
administrative tribunal were in excess of its ;power, or
in the unlawful abuse of that power. In the event the
action complained of should be found to be arbitrary,
or illegally exercised, then and only then would the
court vacate, reverse, correct or modify." Id. at 732
(Emphasis added).
This case is directly on point and supported by board of adjustment cases from other jurisdict~ons. 4
The existence of Section 10-9-15 could arguably remove a
request for judicial review out of the scope of Rule 65(b)(2). 5
4 For other cases from other jurisdictions supporting the limited
appellate scope of judicial review to board of adjustment
decisions see City of Baltimore v. Borinsk:(, 239 Md. 611, 212
A.2d 508 (Md.App. 1965) (denial of use variance to build office
in residential zone); Siller v. Board of Supervisors of City and
County of San Francisco, 25 Cal. Rptr. 73, 375 P.2d 41 (1962)
(challenge to Planning Commission's grant of variance to reduce
off street-parking); Levy v. Board of Adjustment of Arapahoe
County r~l41.,,,,Gol. ~ 493,- -369:c' P. 2d~'c991-,,..-C1962+~-(denial---Of--variance to_~=
reduce acreage per lot); Eason Oil Company v. Uhls, 518 P.2d 50
(Okla., 1974) (denial -of ·use variances-to permit oil drilling in
nondrilling areas); Monte Vista Prof.· Bldg. v. City of Monte,
Vista, 531 P.2d 400 (Colo. App. 1975) (contesting condition& of
variance granted); Whitcomb v. City of Woodward,.616 P.2d 455
(Okl.App., 1980) (denial of use variance); Rickard v.
Fundenberger, 1 Kan.App.2d 222, 563 P.2d 1069 (1977) (contesting
interpretation of Board refusing to revoke accessory building
permit); Ivancovich v. City of Tucson Board of Adjustment, 22
Ariz.App. 530, 529 P.2d 242 (1974) (granting of height variance).
7

0

5 utah cases are not helpful. The only cases noted under 10-9-15
do not address the issue of what type of procedure is
appropriate, for in both cases the protesting property owners
failed to bring suit against the boards of adjustment • In Provo
City v. Claudin, 91 U 60, 63 P.2d 570, failed to challenge an
interpretation of "funeral home" to the Board as authorized,
choosing .rather to :..sue .the .City :..Commission ignoring an
admin.istrative appeal of the -interpretation; and Crist v.
Mapleton City, 28 U.2d 7, 497 P.2d 633 (1972) where the board
(footnote continued)
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However, even under such an interpretation i t does not follow
that its existence dictates changes of the substantive rights,
scope of review or presumptions traditionally afforded under
constitutional appellate review 6 of administrative zoning board
decisions, whether the remedy be denoted "review", "certiorari",
"appeal" or

11

action".

For example, it should be noted that Title 10 only applies
to cities and to so hold grants an aggrieved party who owns land
in unincorporated. areas of the county (who is denied a variance
by a county Board of Adjustment under Section 17-27-16)7 a different substantive right for invoking the Court's limited appellate jurisdiction.

This fact is true because judicial review of

county Boards of Adjustment are by extraordinary writ of certiorari.

.Appellant submits such result would make reason stare.
··,It is resp~ctfully submitted that Section ~:10-9-15 U .c .A.

- should be read 'i_n conjunction with Rules 81 (d) and 65 (bl (2) '·of

5ruled ..on a contested interpretation over whether plaintiff• s
'.ope·ration was a "°s<::?hool u authorized in residen.tial di.etricts.
However, plaintiff did not sue the board but ignoring Section 109-15 to sue the building official v.ia a. writ of mandamus. The
court ruled suit against the building.official was improper when
they -should have sued the Board under Section 10-9-15 ..
6section 7, Article VIII,· Utah :State Con·stitution ~
. 7 section 17-27-16, Utah Code Ann. authorized counties to create
boards of adjustment to perform basically the same functions as
under the parallel for cities Section 10-9-12, Utah Code Ann,
However, the statute ·is silent as to limitations or pro-cedures
for judicial review, which apparently wi11 dictate proceeding
by Rule 65(b) (2) under Rule 8l(d), U.R,C.P.
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the U.R.C.P.

Utah should continue to follow the other well

reasoned decisions of this and other states that limit appellate
review of zoning board decisions to a review of the evidence
before the administrative board and whether they acted arbitrarily, capriciously or illegally.
B.

SECTION 10-9-15 DOES NOT DICTATE A TRIAL DE
NOVO ON ISSUES OR EVIDENCE, BUT MERELY CLARIFIES THE COURT IS NOT CONFINED TO THE FORMAL
WRITTEN RECORD OF THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDING.

Section 10-9-15 is silent as to the type of hearing and
scope of evidence that is appropriate upon the judicial review of
the administrative action.

However Utah administrative review

case law provides the answer.
The 1976 Utah case of Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of
Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976) arose out of the
County Commission's revocation of plaintiff's massage/he_altb_ ·"-----studio license.

Plaintiff appealed to district court which held

her petition for review should be via extraordinary writ; plaintiff filed an interlocutory appeal to claim a trial de nova_.
This Court affirmed, acknowledg_ing the responsibility of the
district court to exercise its appellate review to conduct its
constitutional supervisory control over inferior courts and tribunals under Section 7, Article VIII of the Utah State Constitution.

Further, it held with the trial court that the Peatross

·facts fell under Rule 65(b) and that there was only limited
appellant review.

It states:
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"The standard rule is that appellate jurisdiction is
the authority to review the actions or judgments of an
inferior tribunal UIX>n the record made in that tribunal, and to affirm, modify or reverse such action or
judgment." Id. at p. 284 (Emphasis added).
The court goes on to state that:

"·

". • • .where the defendant Board has conducted a hear· ing that comported wth due process requirements, and
where there is no express statutory grant of. a trial de
novo, the plaintiff was mistaken in her insistence that
she is· entitled to one as a matter of right. However
we deem it appropriate to observe that notwithstanding
what we have said herein, the petition for and the
issuance of an extraordinary writ under Rule 65B is in
the nature of a proceeding in equity; and we do not
desire to be understood as foreclosing the proposition
that the district court in the exercise of its general
powers as hereinabove pointed out, could take evidence
if it thought that the· interests of justice so
required." Id. at p. 284 (Emphasis added).
The

c~~rt

in Peatross, (purely a: Rule 65(B) action) relied

upon the earlier 1955 case of Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Central Weber Sewer Improvemen.t District, 4 U.2d
287 P.2d 884 (1955).

10~,

This 1955 D&RGW case did not arise under

Rule 6:.S(B) but under a statute. 8
Plaintiffs contested they were entitled to a trial de novo,
while the sewer district urged that only the certified evidence
and record were reviewable.

The court disagreed with both.

held a review of the record must be made

in~light

It

of due pro-

8 ouoting footnote No. 1 at 287 P.2d 836 of the 1955 D&RGW case
the relevant portion of Section 3, Chapter 32, Laws of Utah, 1951
provided a remedy for a protesting property owner to "apply for a
writ of -review of the actions· .of· the board • • • " No: grant of
trial de novo is mentioned.

-17;;..
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cess.

If the record reveals the board complied with due -process

and those facts support or negate the decision, the court could
examine only the record to determine if there has been an abuse
of discretion.

However, if the record is inadequate the court is

entitled to determine what facts were before the administrative
tribunal and determine the factual considerations of the board.
The only case of which the writers --are -aware,- -where a
statute uses the word "plenary", arose in the earlier 1940 case
of Denver & R.G.W.R.Co. v. Public Service Commission, 98 U. 431,
100 P.2d 552 (1940) where the statute authorized a "plenary
review" which was to "proceed as a trial de nova".

This old case

describes "plenary review" as a "full review, a complete
review".

The court went on to describe, on page 554, that this

statute's express grant of a trial de novo did not contemplate
retrial upon new evidence because this is inconsistent with appellate review.

Rather, it was to be a trial upon the ,record

made before the administrative body.
Thus, in this case, where a trial de novo was expressly
granted, as is not the case before the bar, it was viewed as
me~ely

enlarging the type of evidence to extend beyond the certi-

fied record.

It did not enlarge the judicial review to become

the administrative hearing officer or allow it to consider
matters not before the original administrative body.
In summary, Appellant submits that in -absence-of an express
statutory grant of a trial de

~

the Lower Court erred in
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establishing itself as the City's Board of Adjustment.

Further,

the "plenary action" language of the statute merely entitles the
reviewing court to extend beyond the certified record 9 and. to
accept testimony or evidence to get a more complete record of the
facts, arguments and considerations which were before the administrative body decision, as describE?d in D&RGW Co. v. Central
Weber Sewer

Impi:o~ement

District,

supra~.,_

The evidence of factors

not considered or presented to the ·Board should not have been
received in evidence.

The retrial of issues and facts, on their

meritsi··,fby the Lower Court as occurred in this case, will result
with the Court becomi'ng a super board of. adjus.tment.

This result

is wrong and should be rejected ·by this Court.
C.

THE LOOER COURT ERRED IN FAI.LING TO GIVE THf;
BOARD DECISION A PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND
IN FAILING.. TO IMPOSE THE :.BURDEN OF PROOF .TO
ESTABLISH BOARD ERROR BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE.

The Lower., Court fa.iled. .. to .apply the•.~universally accepted
- -~principle for. the judicial re"view. ,of zoning board decisions; that
is:

they are .presumptively -valid and the challenger has the

burden <of proof .to have them overturned.

These rules were

developed to. preserve the constitutional system _of checks and
balances and s·eparations of_ powers.

This Court enunciated and

adopted these principles in Cottonwood Heights, supra..

Here this

9As the court would simi1a.r1y hav.e discretion. to do undE?r
Peatross in a Rule 65(b) action.
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•
court recognized that:

(1) Where boards are dealing with matters

charged to their responsibility, it is assumed those boards have
specialized experience or expertise in the area, and they are to
be afforded a wide latitude in exercising their discretionary
judgments; (2)

The Board's actions are endowed with a presump-

tion of validity; and (3) The challenger must prove an abuse of
discretion or illegal actions by the zoning board by clear and
convincing evidence.

See also, Peatross v. Board of Commis-

sioners of Salt Lake County, supra and Naylor v. Salt Lake City,
supra;

Ga~land

v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra, for other zoning

cases where the general principle is sustained.
These principles are necessary to allow boards to fulfill
their statutory responsibilities and powers involving discretionary judgments; for example, here under Section 10-9-12 to determine spirit and intent of City zoning ordinances, impacts of
variances, etc.).

In the Williams case, -supra, Judge Mcintyre

recognized that zoning variances involve -such discretionary judgment and indicates:
• "That however, is a matter of opinion which in
this instance was addressed to the sound discretion of
the adjustm~_i1t_board. As lon<J as our state statute
authorizes exce fions and variances to be made, we
cannot if we would erevent them from eing made, unless
the board 1 s discretion is abused." 383 P.2d at 733
(Emphasis added).
This rule supports its underlying purpose to preserve the separation of powers and permit bodies with special expertise to function, without undue judicial interference.

In short, the burden
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is on the challenger to prove Board abuse of discretion or
illegality; he correctly summarizes:

·\'..-i..~~

"In keeping. with the general rule that, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, public officers will be
presumed to, have properly pe..rformed their duties and
not to have acted il1-egally, de_cisions of -zoning boards
of adjustment as to exceptionsdand variations are
.regarded as presumptively fair, reasonable and correct;
and the burden is upon those complaining thereof to
show the board acted impropet6Y." ( ci ta tio.ns omitted,
Id. at 733, emphasis added).
.
The standard of judicial restraint to preve.nt inappropr.iate

judicial':interference with the administration of local zoning,
has also been clearly stated

~y

this_ Court; in Cottonwood

Heights, this Court observed:

-r··

.,

..

"* * * and their action [administrative special use
permit] endowed with a presumption of validity which
the court should not interfere with unless.;. it -is shown
that there is no reasonable basis t:o Justify the action
taken.::H 593 -P.2d at p~ DIO (Emphashs ·added)'. · ·-:~-

'··~·

It is' for ,:~the"'~challenger of a:·Board of Adjustment's ...action to:
bear. the bur.den ta'. show the decision i-s arb.i_trary and capri ... _

cious~ 11

The: -court. .mus·t not invade and substitute.r its. ju.dgment

unless it is shown .by... clear (and-

convinc~ng

·"that· there is· no reasonable-· basis
its actions must therefore be

)'": e·rror or.... ~~ow~ng _

wha~soeyer

regard~g

to

ju~!tify

it and.:

as capricious and arbi-

10 see also ·Ivancovich v. City of Tucson, supra; Whitcomb v. City
of Woodward, supra, Eason Oil Co. v. Uhls, supra, Siller v. Board
of Supervisors of the City & ~ounty of ~.~r.1 F·~-~ncisco, supra;.
1 1Gay-land·v. Salt Lake County, supra; 4 R. Andersc>n, American Law
of Zoning, §25.26, p. 263 (2nd Ed, l977).
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....

trary. n 12
Since the law requires •no reasonable basis to justify the
action," before a judicial reversal may be made, a situation
where reasonable parties might differ obviously does not present
facts sufficient to justify the Court substituting its judgment
for that of the Board of Adjustment.

The self-restraint required

of the reviewing court has been explained-in Yackley, Zoning Law
and Practice, Second Edition, Vol. 1 at p. 4 79, quoted in the
Colorado Levy case, supra.

It noted:

"It is a well settled proposition of zoning law that a
court will not substitute its judgment for the judgment
of the board. The court may not feel that the decision
of the board was the best that could have been rendered
under the circumstances.
It may thoroughly disagree
with the reasoning by which the board reached its decision.
It may feel that the decision of the board was a
substandard piece of logic and thinking. Nonetheless,
the court will not set aside the board's view of the
"matter.- ~us-t -to--in3ect~-.i-ts_,own ideas into_ the picture of_
things\1
369 ,p.2d -994,-+Ernph-asis added).
To the-same effect is the-Kansas case of. Rickard v.
Fundenberger, supra.

Here, the court held the trial court

exceeded permissible review when it substituted its judgment for
a Board who

refused to cancel a building permit for an accessory

building and proceeded to reduce its size.

Similar to the case

before the bar, that Kansas Lower Court judge stated he believed
12Naylor v. Salt Lake Cit~ Corp.,_supra at p. 766. See also
Siller v. Board of Su ervisors of cit & Count of San Francisco,
supra, at p.
; Monte Vista Pro essiona B ~·, Inc. v. City of
Montec--Vista,--"supra at p. -402-3; -Whi-tcornb"V. City of Woodward,
supra, at p. 456; Rickard v. Fundenberger, supra at p. 1072.
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he had a large measure of discretion in such cases. l3

correctly,

he was reversed by the Kansas Supreme Court.
In the case now before '.this Court. the district court's
finding and statements. on the record clearly reflect (because of
-construing the: heari_Qg. as a "de novo','. ··trial)· that it felt no
obligation

of"~~judicial

restraint.

Tt felt free to and did sub-

stitute its judgment for the Board's. _In doing so, the Lower
Court ignored the facts before the Board demonstrating the
reasonable basis for the Board' S· ·decision, improperly shifted the
burden of· pro·of and exceeded· its authority.

Thus, the Lower
.c::

Court should be reversed.
The facts of the condition of the site, as they were
presented to the Board, were not in substantial disagreement,
although there was some confu.sion about the past history. 14 ·They
demonstrated tna t .xanthos was seeking· to -legalize the existence
of a dwelling unit which basically was an illegally-converted
garage behind a duplex.

To comply with ordinances, it would

require that the structure not be used as a

dw~lling;

thus it

either must be-removed or used as .a shed or·some accessory use.
Its negative impact on Xanthos was the loss of ·a rental unit
and the income it produced.

The benefits to the City of the

13Rickard v. Fundenberger, supra at p. 1072. Compare with Judge
Rigtrup statements and findings. (R-113, 137-40, .and 346).
14 see Statements of Facts, part C. ·
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variance denial were that it would bring the site into zoning
compliance.

It would not legalize or encourage the continued use

of a dwelling considered substandard in material ways including:
the lack of frontage on a dedicated street; inadequat:,e front,
rear and side yards; the absence of necessary square footage for
a place of human habitation; -and other related impacts. 15

In

short, a variance would materially have interferred with the goal
of bringing the site into zoning compliance and enhancing the
secondary area and neighborhood.
D.

THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS ITS DECISION

It appears from the record, already cited in the Statement
of Facts, that the court disagreed with the Board, basically,
because of the economic impact on Respondent and because of the
~

-less of--one dwe-11.ing unit- in-- t.he_ City.

Th_e Lower_

Cou~r~t _view~d

____ _

the impact of its continued use as a dwelling only -from tangible
results of its removal; it gave less weigh t~than the Board did to
-- ---'-"_,-the -goals· -and- purposes ' that:----zc:min<}'--Ordinances are a-ttempting _to_
0

achieve. 16
Appellant submits there is more than reasonable support for
the Board's decision.

The Lower Court, based on its prejud-ices-

and judgment, simply disagreed with the priorities of the

l 5 statement of Facts,~paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 14 and 15.
16 statement of Facts, pages 2-4, 6, 8, 11-12, 14-15 and 17.
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Board.

Thus,

in error it felt free to substitute its judgment.

Consequently, as a matter of law, the trial court' decision
should be reversed and the board's decision affirmed.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS INDEPENDENT
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A
VARIANCE UNDER SECTION 10-9-12(3) BY MISCONSTRUING THE REQUISITE CRITERIA.
The Lower Court seriously misconstrued Section 10-9-12(3),
Utah Code Ann., 1953.

A proper reading of that section would

have resulted in the court's denial of the requested variance,
regardless of the scope of review.

Section 10-9-12(3) states:

"The board of adjustment shall have the following powers:
" ( 3) To authorize upon appeal such variance from the terms
of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the public
interest, where owing to special conditions a literal
enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result
in unnecessary hardship; provided, that the spirit of the
ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done.
Before any variance may be authorized, however, it shall be
shown that:
"(a) The variance will not substantially affect the
comprehensive plan of zoning in the city and that
adherence to the strict letter of the. ordinance will
cause difficulties and hardships, the imposition of
which upon the petitioner is unnecessary in order to
carry out the general purpose of the plan.
"(b) Special circumstances attached to the property
covered by the application which do not generally apply
to the other property in the same district.
"(c) That because of said special circumstances,
property covered by application is deprived of privileges possessed by other properties in the same district; ;and that the granting of !the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a subs tan ti al property right
possessed by other property in the same district.
(Emphasis added)
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At a minimum, the statute requires that the applicant
show:

(1) special conditions attached to the property; (2)

unnecessary hardship; and (3) the deprivation of substantial
property rights.

Then the Board must use its discretion to weigh

such factors against the spirit of the ordinance.

The Respondent

has failed on every count to satisfy the required showings.
1.

Special Conditions.

The reviewing court found that the following special circumstances existed:
"There are special circumstances attached to the
property covered by the application whi~~ do not
generally apply to other properties in the same
district including, but not limited to:
(a) the age
and occupancy of the dwelling; (b) the approval by the
City of the development of the duplexes the issuance of
certificates of occupancy for the duplexes (sic); and
(c) the failure of the City to inform James Xanthos
that the dwelling would not comply with zoning ordinances -thereby failing to give him the opportunity to
redesign the layout for the duplexes in such a way as
not to require the demolition of the-dwelling."
Amended Finding of Fact i21, App.Ex.5.
Assuming that the facts cited in (a)-(c) are supported by the
evidence, the enumerated special circumstances are not the type
contemplated by the statute.
First, the language of subsection 3(b) states the "special
circumstances" to be considered by the board are those that are
"attached to the property covered by the application".

A compar-

ison of the parallel code section governing county boards of
adjustment makes it more explicit.

It states:
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"
• • Upon appeals the Board of Adjustment shall have
the following powers:
• • • (3) Where bt reason of
exceetional narrowness, shallowness or s ape of a
specific piece of property at the time of the enactment
of the re~ulation, or by reason of exceptional toeographic conditions or other extraordinary and exceptional
situation or condition of such piece of·· property, the
strict application of any regulation enacted under this
act would result. i~.. peculiar and exceptional practical
. difficulties to, ot exceptional and undue hardshfps
upon, the owner of: such property, to au th or ize, upon an
appeal relating to said property, a variance from such
strict application so as to relieve such difficulties
or hardship, provided such relief may be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and without substantially impairing the intent and purpose of
the zone plan and zoning resolutions." §l 7-·27-16,
U.C.A., 1953, as amended (Emphasis added).
The specificity of this statute drives home the point that the
"special circumstances" to be considered in the variance process
_are those that are basically topographic in nature.

Furthermore,

these topographical conditions must be unique to the subject
property; those conditions that affect an entire district are not
sufficient to grant a variance:
"The requirement of unique circumstances is not met
simply by pointing out differences between the applicant's land and. the land of other owners.
It is not
enough that, in fact and in law,~ each par·cel; of .l.and is
unique. The unique circumstances which must be e~tab
lished are those 'related to the hardship· complained.,
of •.. If singu.l_ar and related, topoEraphical, features are
lacking, the· ·court ma·~ not find t at the circumstances. ·,
which plague the applicant are different from those
which af feet the la·na · of ·his- nejAhbors." . - Anderson,· . ·
American Law of Zoning 2d Ed. Sl .34 and cases cited
therein.
(Emphasis added).
Thus, the type of special condition contemplated by· §10-912(3) is that which applies· directly to ·the land in question.
The most diligent search of the record will not reveal one shred
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of evidence concerning this type of special circumstance.
Indeed, the court's Finding No. 21 evidences little regard ___ for
circumstances that attach to the land, but instead places great
emphasis on the failure of the City to detect and resolve viola. tions during construction.

Cursory examination of the enumerated

"special circumstances" will show that they do not qualify as
special conditions.
As to the Lower Court's finding about "the age and occupancy
of the dwelling", a building may be old and have a history of
illegal occupancy.

That fact may or may not make it unique in

the zoning district; but, it tells us nothing about specific
topographical features relating to the property which distinguish
it from other properties in the same district.

If a variance can

be sustained simply because of the existence of an old building
on a lot, the goal of bringing non-conforming buildings into
compliance would be thwarted; zoning would soon be by variance,
rather than ordinance.

Pointing out that an old building is on

the lot merely recognizes that no two parcels ·are
alike.

e~actly

In this 'broad sense, every parcel has unique characteris-

tics and could qualify for special treatment; and this absurd
result demands a stricter interpretation of the requirement.
The court's other special circumstances "(b)" and "(c)" are,
likewise, manifestly unrelated to the property in question.

They

obviously relate only to the relationship between the Respondent
and the City zoning officials.
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The court's findings imply that differences between individual owners of parcels can be considered as a "special circumstance."

This ruling invites the type of arbitrary and capri-

cious action that should be guarded against, because the variance
runs with the land.

The. holding of the court below, if allowed

to stand, would result ··.in the anomolous position that the Board
of Adjustment could grant

varian~es

to individuals it felt demon-

strated sympathetic personal circumstances.
Of course, just the converse is the rule.

If the property

is susceptible of productive use, the desires of the particular
owner cannot be considered.

The rule is that "[A] variance per-

tains to the property, not to the owner."

Stice v. Gribben Allen

Motors, Inc., 216 Kan. 744, 534 P.2d 1267, 1272 (1975). 17
·The Board, therefore, submits that the court below improperly found "unusual·· c i rcurns tances", based on facts .. which; under a
proper reading of the s ta tu te, 'must not be considered at all. '
Fur thermo re, there

J.9 no evidence in the record that the topo-

graphy of this parcel is unique in any way.

I·n fact, what evi-

dence there is supports the view that this parcel is completely
ordinary.

Therefore, it was error for the court to compel the

granting of the variance.
2.

Unnecessary Hardship.

17see also: Anderson, supra, _§18.30; City and Borou~h of Juneau,
595 P.2d 626, (Alaska, 1979); Lovell v. Planning Cornn, 37
Or.App. 3, 586 P.2d 99 (1978).
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The "unnecessary hardship" requirement of the law has
evolved into a principle limiting the power of boards of adjustment to grant variances.

Similar language appears in the stat-

utes of nearly all of the states. 18

Even though this is a nebu-

lous term, the courts have, historically, been quick to vest the
term with content so as to protect comprehensive zoning plans.
The most widely-accepted definition of unnecessary hardship
is found in the landmark case of Otto v. Steinhilber, a New York
court of appeals case dating to 1939.

The court said:

"Before the board may exercise its discretion and grant
a variance upon the ground of unnecessary hardship, the
record must show that (1) the land in question canno~
yield a reasonable return if used only for a purpose
allowed in that zone: (2) that the plight of the owner
is due to unique circumstances and not to the general
conditions in the neighborhood which ma reflect the
unreasona leness of t e zonin ordinance itse f: and
(
that the use to be authorized by t e variance will
not alter the essential character of the locality."
282~N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d~s1~(195911 reh. den. 2a2~N.Y.
681, 26 N.E.2d 811 (Emphasis added).
Although other courts have slightly altered this standard, it
remains the classic definition of unnecessary hardship. 19
The question, then, is whether or not the court's findings
regarding unnecessary hardship are in harmony with the great
weight of authority on this point.

The findings of the court

indicate that the hardships it considered were:

18Anderson, American Law Zoning 2d Ed. §18.09.
19Anderson, Id. §18.16.
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"10. There is in Salt Lake City a shortage of low
income housing and the elimination of this dwelling
which provides low cost housing is inconsistent with
the public need and interest.
"11. Elimination of this unit would cause a hardship
to a tenant ,who would be depi:.i ved of a habitable
dwelling at' a relatively low cost of $150.00 per month •
. "12. Elimination of the unit also creates an economic
hardship for the plaintif.f in this action by, ipiposing
an unnecessary loss· of $150.00 per month.•
(App.Ex.5)
These hardships fall into two categories: (1) an economic hardship upon the owner due to the loss of rental income (finding no.
12)1 (2) hardship upon the community generally and a tenant specifically in the loss of housing (findings nos. 10 and 11).

In

addition, Finding of Fact No. 21(c) implies that a hardship upon
the Respondent existed because he was not informed of the nonconforming nature of his plans soon enough to change them.
(a)

Economic Hardship Upon the Owner.

This Court in 1939,

ruling on the predecessor statute··to Section 10-9-12(3), indica ted -that: an economic benefit to -the owner is not a sufficient
reason to compel the granting of a variance.

It noted that any

person could argue that if he were granted a variance he could
make a more profitable use of his land.
Trust Co., 97

u.

Walton v. Tracy Loan &

249, 92 P.2d 724, 728 (1939).

Case law across

the country uniformly upholds this view.
As Anderson points out, since a variance runs with the land,
and not the owner, "[i]t follows that • • • hardship which is
merely personal to the current owner of real property will not
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justify the granting of a variance.•
2d.Ed. §18.30.

American Law of Zoning,

As the Arizona court has correctly noted, neither

the board, nor the court upon review, can be governed by financial considerations alone; rather: "'They are bound to take a
broader view than the apparent monetary distress of the owner.'
(citation omitted)"

Ivancovich v. City of Tuscon Board of

Adjustment, supra, 529 P.2d at 249.

"The universal rule is that

'the financial loss or the potential of financial advantage to
the applicant is not the proper basis for a variance'."

Stice v.

Gribben Allen Motors, Inc., Parsons, supra, 534 P.2d 1272 and
numerous cases cited therein.
The position taken by the Lower Court would soon riddle the
uniform zoning plan with personal economic variances.

As Justice

Tobriner in writing for the California Supreme Court, has recognized:
"In a word, 'profit motive is not and (sic) adequate
ground for a variance.' (citations omitted) • • • If
conditions which merely reduce profit margin were
deemed sufficiently 'exceptional' to warrant relief
from the zoning laws, then all but the least imaginative developers could obtain a variety of variances,
and the 'public interest in the enforcement of a comprehensive zoning plan' (citation omitted) would
inevitably yield to the private interest in the maximization of profits." Broadway, Laguna, Vallejo Ass'n.
v. Board of Permit Appeals of city and County of San
Francisco, 59 Cal.Rptr 146, 427 P.2d 810, 815 (1967)
(Emphasis added).
Of course, as the court went on to note, any hardship can ultimately be put into economic terms.

But the point is that the

"unnecessary hardship" requirement is not met by a showing of a
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loss of rental income.
The facts clearly indicate there is no sufficient hardship
in this case to justify the variance requested.

There are eight

rental units now on the property that are producing income.

Just

because their income is less than,·the Respondent wishes and the
extra rental unit's income cushions his margin is insufficient
basis for a finding of unnecessary hardship to sustain a variance.
(b)

Hardship Upon the Community in General.

The conclusion

of the court below was that a shortage of low income housing
exists in Salt Lake City.

There was no evidence presented by

Respondent and only generalized statements of City zoning officials,. on questioning·' by the court, that no city has enough low
income housing.
to deny

~the

B·a-sed·· on those sta·tements, the court held that

variance would -.create.;.a hardship- upon the.community

and tenant, since a·dweilinglwould·

be~lost;

·This assumption by

- the court falls far short of: the hardship .contemplated by Section
10-9-12(3).
The statute, itself, compels consideration of only those
hardships which are upon the applicant.

Subsection 3(a) reads:

"· • • the imposition of which [hardship] upon the petitioner is
unnecessary • • • • "

There is no indication that the board or the

reviewing court should consider other generalized or perceived
interests.
zoning administrative authorities are properly concerned
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with advancing the intent and purpose of legislation, not in
subs ti tu ting their_ own personal policy ~for .the legislation. ··The
variance power must, therefore, be strictly construed; otherwise,
the Board and the reviewing court will be making forays into
public policy areas set-aside for elected legislative bodies.

If

zoning ordinances are felt by the board or the court to conflict
with community welfare, then the proper remedy lies in amending
the ordinance, not in the granting variances. 20
Furthermore, testimony in the record indicates that the well
considered policy of the City is contrary to the finding of the
court.

Mr. Allen Johnson, Deputy Director of Advanced Planning

for Salt Lake City testified:
nThe witness: • • • We are committed, I think, as a
moral obligation in the planning department in this
city to not only increase the numbers of low income
housing, but the quality of the .life style that is
afforded or that is available to that low income tenant
or individual. So it's a two pronged.attack, one of
quantity and one of· quality. We- are. spending our _
limited resources as a city to do both of these things
as best we can while at the same time doing other
things. • • •
nThe court: Do you recognize that there is a shortage
of housing in Salt Lake?
nThe witness: There is a shortage in every city of
quality low income housing.
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"Q.
(By Ms. Lever) Have you ever received a directive,
though, that even though there is a need for housing,
that that has priority to allow or to encourage the
existence of or the construction of buildings that are
substandard as applied to the zoning standards?
"A •. - No. We ·have not received a direct order or the
.. City does not have a pol icy that allows for the con. struction of substandard buildings at the expense of
· the zonin ordinance that uarantees those amenities.
(R- 0 -05
(Emp as1s added).
All indications are that the court below overstepped its bounds
in considering.community· interests as a hardship under §10-9-

12 ( 3). 21
The case law. -is in de.finite.
0

accord.~

A Massachusetts court

faced the argument that denial of a variance for apartment buildings created a cognizable hardship.

The court said:

"The most obvious deficiency. in the board's decision is
the lack of a finding of 'conditions especially affecting such parcel • • • but not affecting generally the
zoning.. district in which it is located,' such that
'substantial -hardship; ~--financial -or otherwise to theappellant' is invo,lved.
Indeed, the board's only finding of .a hardship·. is 'that - ha rdship -ex is ts in that
there. is a shortage of housing uni ts for large
fami1ies.' This is obviousty~not a 'hardship, financial or otherwise to the appellant' seek~ng a variance
before the board, in this case the developer of the ·
parcel." Cass v. Board of Appeal of Fall River, 317
N. E. 2d 77, 79 (Mass .App. 197'4).
(Emphasis added).
1

The California courts agree, stating:
"The claim that the development would probably serve

21 The result in this case demonstrates the problems with a de
novo type review as contemplated by the court below, i.e., courts
must become enmeshed in public policy questions more properly
left to the legislative -body. This court warned of such a result
in the Walton case, supra, 92 P.2d at 727.
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various community needs may be highly desirable, but it
too does not bear on the issue at hand [that of hardship]. 0
Topanga Ass'n v. County of Los Angeles, 113
Cal.Rptr. 836, 522 P.2d 12, 21 (Cal. 1974); accord,
Broadway, supra, 427 P.2d at 817.
In sum, the court erred by:

(1) weighing the enforcement of

the zoning ordinances against the need for low income housing
which is a function more properly reserved to the legislative
body; and (2) by considering a hardship upon the community as a
hardship under Section 10-9-12(3), which instead should be
focused on the hardships of the variance applicant.
(c)

Hardship Due to City's Failure to Warn.

As evidenced

by Finding of Fact Nos. 21(c), and 15-19 the court held that the
City had a duty to inform Mr. Xanthos of errors in his plans.
The failure of the City to warn him early enough to allow him to
change his plans resulted in a hardship which should now, according to the Court, justify a variance.

In essence, the courtheld

that the City should be -es topped to enforce the_ zoning ordinances
because of their supposed failure to

0

catch" the non-complying

building during plan review or construction.
This holding is in error for at least two reasons:

(1) The

law in this state is that a municipality cannot be estopped from
enforcing its zoning ordinances, even though its officials may
have mislead a citizen into believing that he could erect a noncomplying structure; and (2) the particular facts of this case
are not sufficiently compelling to warrant the 9ranting of an
estoppel.
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This case should be governed by Dansie v. Murray City, 560
P.2d 1123 (Ut., 1977).

The operative facts are similar and, even

though in that case substantial good faith cash investments would
be wasted if the ordinance was enforced, this Court held the city
was not estoppe.d,.

Sinc.e. in this case the building in question

can still be put to: beneficial use, even if the ordinance is
enforced; a similar holding is required here.
Second, even assuming that an estoppel might be imposed
against a city, when acting in a governmental capacity because of
the unauthorized acts of its officials; the facts of this case
would not compel _such a result. Even when all the underlying
facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the him, the
Respondent does not qualify to benefit by estoppel.

Basic rules

concerning the granting of an estoppel state:
,·_.. ". • • [A] party may .not properly base a claim_ of
·,·,., es toppel in his favor on his own wrongful act or
.:'derelection of duty; or, fraud committed or -participated
-·in by him, or·:·on acts or omis·sions induced by his own
conduct, concealment, or representations • • • • One who
claims a 'benefit of an estoppel on the ground that he
has been mislead by the representations of another must
not have been mislead through his own want of reason:able care and circumspection. A lack of diligence by a
party claiming an estoppel is generally fatal. 11 28
Am.Jur.2d 719-722, Estoppel and Waiver, §79-80
(Emphasis added).
The undisputed facts of the case ;indicate.. that ·the failure of the
City to warn Mr. James Xanthos ·Of the non-complying nature of his
plan was based, at least, in part on the inaction of Mr. Xanthos
or his agents and the deceptiveness or incompleteness· of the
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plans that were submitted.
First of all, it is undisputed that the plans and applications that were submitted to the City for review were at least,
inconsistent and inaccurate. 22

The plot plan, instead of showing

a dwelling, showed only an "existing building."

The application

for a building permit was improperly filled out; where it asked
for "previously used land or structure", Mr. Xanthos or his agent
put "vacant".

Also, on the line which read "Dwelling uni ts now

on lot:", "O" appears.

Additionally, the blank under "accessory

bldgs. now on lot" was left blank.
On examination, both Mr. Blair and Mr. Hafey testified that
if the application had indicated a dwelling on the premises,
permits for the duplexes would not have been issued (R-225-26,
255-56).

However, opposing counsel argued and the court held

tha tc these- ambiguities made_ it incumbent upon :the City _to _either
investigate further or be estopped

~to:deny

a variance.

Indeed, this is the penultimate decision:

who should bear

the burden of an incomplete and/or deceptive application for a
building permit?
or upon the City?

Should it be on the applicant and representor
If the law required the City to "investigate

or be estopped" upon the discovery of some ambiguity, Utah cities
would be required to play cat and mouse with every person that

~2Findings ,of Fact Nos. 15, 19; see App.Ex. 1 and 2 for the plan
and application.
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applied for a building permit.

Such a rule would encourage or

reward deception, inaccuracy, incompleteness and elusiveness upon
the part of all applicants for permits.
In other words, such a rule encourages one to submit ambiguous plans that, appear to comply 1 but build as you want.

It would

create enormous incentive to corrupt inspectors and more tax
dollars would go to hypercritical inspection.· People ·would be
encouraged to hide facts from the City off icia1s, in hopes that ·
they might be able to proceed undetected to a point that their
change in position would operate to es top the City from enforcing
the ordinance.
lost.

The comprehensive zoning plan would soon be

This result is clearly inimical to public policy.
Rather, the law is and must be that the applicant for a

building permit who fails· to completely divulge his circumstances
must bear the risk the City may later find violations that would
warrant the stoppage of: construction.
dictio~~

Case law from other juris-

considering this issue so hold.

In City of Chicago v.

Zellers a building permit had wrongfully been.issued and, thereafter, revoked by the city.

The plaintiff argued that the city

should be estopped from enforcing the ordinance and stopping the
construction, since the permit had been issued.

However, the

court found that the permit had been issued partly as a result of
ambiguous plans and, therefore, found that even though those
plans had been submitted, checked and approved by various divisions of the building department, that they were deceptive on
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their face.

The court thus held that estoppel would be improper

against the city.
{Ill.App. 1965).

64 Ill.App.2d 24, 212 .N.E.2d 737, 739-40
An Oklahoma case dealt with a similar subject,

and that court said:
"To allow a property owner to circumvent, or obtain an
· exception to, zoning ordinances by putting himself in a
position {through his own acts and those of his agent
or servant} wherein that enforcement would have a
harsh, or detrimental, affect on him would practically
emasculate such ordinances and make of their attempted
enforcement a mere mockery." In re Pierce's Appeal,
347 P.2d 790, 793, {Okla. 1959).
The facts of this case indicate that this would be an
improper case to apply estoppel.

The Lower Court's finding that

implicitly imposes such an estoppel was grievous error.

Rather,

the law must remain that the applying property owner must bear
the risk of his own agent's carelessness or intentionally misleading representations.
3.

Deprivation of Subs tan ti al Property Rights

The statutory language in Subsection 3{c) provides that the
property covered by the application must be deprived of
privileges possessed by other properties in the same district
because of special circumstances, before a variance can be
awarded.

It has been shown above that there are no special cir-

cumstances that affect this property; thus, there can be no cognizable deprivation of substantial property rights.
Furthermore, it is

Appellant~Board's

contention that the

granting of this variance in essence confers a speciai privilege
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upon the Respondent.

Rather than insuring that this property

shall enjoy the same rights enjoyed by other parcels of property
in the district, the variance instead grants it and its owner a
special privilege, not available to and in derogation.of the
rights of others.'

The· caseo.: law has recognized that . J:h is

undesirable 'result is possible and should be avoi"ded by refusing·
to grant variances, except for those exceptional

topog~aphical

circumstances which act in conjunction with zoning ordinances to
deny the property owner any beneficial use of his property.

For

example, the Alas·ka Supreme Court has pointed out:
"The assertion that the ordinance merely deprives the
landowner of a more profitable operation where the
premises have substantially the same value for permitted uses as other properly within the zoning classification argues, in effect, for the grant of a special
privilege to the selected landowner." City and Borough
of Juneau v. Thibodeau:, ·595 P.2d 626, 635 (Ala., 1979)
accord~ To an ~ Assoc. v~ Count
of Los An eles, supra
~t 22_# 2 C. R'at kopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning,
.45.3 ~t 45-8 (3rd Ed~ 1972).
The converse of this principle would result in invidious
distinctions.

Coronet Homes, Inc. v. McKenzie, 439 P.2d 219, 225

(Nev., 1968).

Furthermore·, to· allow :an applicant a variance on

such a basis would result, in effect, to· a spot zoning change1
this act is, of course, proscribed.

Thurman v. City of Mission,

520 P.2d 1277, 1278, (Kan 1974), Erickson v. City of Portland,
496 P.2d 726, 727 (Or. App. 1972).
The most rational reading, therefore, of the deprivation o·f
substantial property-rights language in the statute requires that
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the applicant show that, under the zoning ordinances, his land
cannot be put to any reasonable use.
put to valuable use.

Here, the parcel is being

The building in question can be used, with-

out even considering the land's use and value in relationship to
the four duplexes as open space, playground areas or other uses,
if removed, as an accessory building without violating the
ordinances.

Significantly, no property owner in the vicinity has

any greater rights or similar privilege.

Therefore, no claim has

been made that satisfies the requirements of the statute; to
gr_ant the variance would result in the conferring of a special
privilege, which is contrary to the spirit of the ordinance and
the constitution as well.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT GRANTING
OF THE VARIANCE WOULD NOT BE CONTRARY TO THE
SPIRIT, OF THE ORDINANCE AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST; IT· IGNORED-.THE RECORD ~S SUPPORT ..FOR _
THE BOARD'S DECISION.
Even if Respondent had met all of his·burden as described in
Point II, this Court has ruled that: "the spirit of the ordinance
must be observed, that is, no variance may be granted which is
not in harmony with the purpose, object, policy, intent and plan
of the City as manifested in the zoning and building ordinances."

Walton v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co., supra at 727.

The

District Court, in its amended findings of fact, found that these
requirements had been met:
"5.

The continued existence of the dwelling, does not
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violate any safety requirements, nor does it impair
access, nor does it adversely affect the health, safety
or morals of the citizens of Salt Lake City.

...

"20.
(a) The variance in this case is not contrary to
the public interest • • • • (c) In light of the fact that
the spirit of the ordinance has been observed and there
has been substantial justice done.
- "22. The imposition of the strict enforcement of the
zoning ordinances upon the petitioner is unnecessary in
order to carry out the general purpose of .the zoning
plan and comprehensive plan in the city."
The Board con~ends that these findings are purely form, being
unsupported 'by wha-t evidence there is in the record; rather, the
spirit and pu.rpose- of the plan have been ignored and not
observed.
The result of the Lower Court's decision underscores the
importance of what one court 'Said, when faced with a similar
problem::
"The:' days are fast- disappearing when the judiciary can
look'at·a zoning ordinance· and-, with nearly as much
confidence as a professional zoning expert, decide upon
the merits of a zoning plan and its con tr ibu tion to the
heal th1 safety, morals O'r general welfare of the community. Courts are becoming increasingly aware that
they are neither super boards of adjust:Jnent nor planning commissions of the last resort." Coronet Homes,
Inc. v. McKenzie, 439 P.2d 219 (Nev.,_ 1968) (.Emphasis

added).
Undoubtedly, the Court below felt that granting this one
isolated variance would be so harmless as to pass unnoticed.
this nearsighted attitude fails to visualize the larger issue.
One authority notes:
t

"Granting a variance for reasons other than extreme
hardship may seem innocuous in its present impact on
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But

the immediate neighborhood. However, 'long range planning may show that this will result in a flood of such
demands, or be inconsistent with the desirable allocation of land uses • • • or hinder the proposed future
evolution of the area into a fine residential one.'
Thus, improper variances not only threaten neighborhood
integrity and undercut the protective purposes of zoning, but they also challenge the objectives of comprehensive urban planning." Shapiro, The Zoning Variance
Power - Constructive in Theor , Destructive in
Practice,
9 Md. L. Rev. 3, 10 (19 9).
(Emphasis
added).
Indeed, unless the variance process is closely guarded, it can be
destructive of the comprehensive zoning plan meant to benefit the
public.

The zoning authorities and the courts have a duty to be

farsighted in protecting the general public's interests from
selfish individual interests.

As the Pennsylvania court has

said:
"While a change • • • seems both small and innocent, it
might be neither when regarded as a trend: and it is
with trends almost more than with individual monstrosities that the zoning authorities are concerned."
Heller v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 171 A.2d 44, 46
(Penn., 1961).
The tenor of Section 10-9-12(3) is not to the contrary.

The

court below erred in having little regard for the C!ty's comprehensive zoning plan; its decision has adversely affected the
zoning plan, in violation of the statute, in at least the following ways:

1.

Parity.

As discussed above, every landowner has an

interest in the enforcement of a comprehensive zoning plan.

Each

time a variance is granted, without a showing of extremely
unusual conditions, the law abiding landowners in the vicinity
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suffer.
Ideally, "'each landownerc-gives up a part of his. freedom -to
use his land in order to comply with zoning laws which are legis-· lated to deliver the greatest good to the greatest number in the
comrnuni ty. ''That law-abidin:g citize-n is all too often cheated by
a liberal variance policy that allows his neighbors to evade the
ordinances.

Coronet Hornes, Inc., supra, at 224.

falls '.into disrepute.

The plan thus

Topanga Ass'n., supra, at 19.

idea that an isolated variance ·g·rant won't really harm

Thus, the

-the

plan

"significantly" is erroneous.
A liberal variance policy would· lead to: ( 1) a flood of
applications for variances; and (2) disrespect for and an eventual disintegration ·of· the comprehensive zon-ing plan. · Therefore,
it is not - in the public interest to allow such variances ind is---·
crirnina tly.
Oh the other hand,

if a landowner can make .a· stiff icient

.: 1

showing of'' "unique"' and' "special conditions" that attach to his
prop~rty,

then parity could be maintained, even though a variance

is granted.
treatment.

The uniqueness of the property- warrants unique
It is this high s·tandard and overall perspective that

the Board uniquely must administer in implementing the spirit of
the ordinance.
2. - Protection.
ordinances are

Mr. Allen Johnson testified that yard size

d~signed

to protect renters and owners from inva-

sions of privacy, as well as from other dangers.

Also, the· ordi-
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•
nances guarantee that renters will have an acceptable yard area,

something that• is lacking here.

He states:

n
•
specifically with respect to the yard area the
building, the zoning ordinance provides open space
around a structure which affords the occupant the privilege of enjoying the outdoors, of doing those things
around your house that you would normally do around the
·house, like hanging your wash out, letting your kids
play outside, having an area guaranteed for that purpose so that it isn't obstructed or interferred with
with somebody else. They are not going to have a carport or a wading pool for instance. The availability
of some assurance that someone walking down the alley
isn't going to look right into your bedroom or bathroom
window, as just a common occurrence walking down the
alley, and the separation from the house to the sideyard property, or the front property line to the street
or the house excuse me. The yard area also, and
especially the rear yard, afford the occupant the space
to do those things that might be necessary to support
the use of his home, where he can store materials that
you wouldn't want to have in the front yard, including
your garbage. Or you can maybe put a workshop or a
garage or a carport or a patio and be assured of some
privacy from the neighbors." (R-394A-395)

Consequently,

the-cour~'s

finding~that,the continued~use~f-

the building as a dwelling did not-impair-access by-fire or
police agents, etc. does not fully address the objective and
goals of yard area requirements.

Furthermore, the importance of

adequate side and rear yards has been recognized by this Court in
Hargreaves v. Young, 3 U.2d 175, 280 P.2d 974 (Utah, 1955).
3.

Accessibility.

The small building in question lacks the

required frontage on a dedicated street.

This was not addressed

by the court's findings, although Mr. Johnson did testify that
this zoning requirement is extremely important to the comprehensive zoning plan:
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"Q.
[By Ms. Lever]
The requirement of frontage on
dedicated streets,_does that have impact or any direct
relationship in terms of the planning purposes and
objectives related to providing services for that
building? Public services?
"A.
[By Mr. Johnson] • • • So frontage provides a
person with, first, a direct accessibility to public
utilities underground, or in this case maybe.some power
poles and things like this.
It also is very, keyed
toward dispatch of emergency services • • • • So that if
an emergency. vehicle was dispatched to that address, we
would have: a difficult time finding the·building, which
is central to a key concern of ours. One of the major
objectives in the fire department is .a reduction in
response time necessary, and the City is judged by our
ability to respond quickly to fires.
The insurance
rates that applies on all the residences of Salt Lake
City is based upon that very fac. tor, along with the
type of equipment we have and. how fast we can get that
equipment in the field and' .respond to emergency situations. The frontage also provides the property owner
with a place where he can take his trash out,. his garbage out and set it up there. He doesn't have to worry
about carrying/"it out and ·putting -it up in, . front of
somebody else's house and walking down somewhere else
on the sidewalk to deposit his trash on the street."
(R-396-97)
The only evldence in the record supports the view that
frontage upon a dedicated street is, indeed, an important aspect
of the zoning ordinance which underpins the Board's decision.

To

allow a variance which encourages the use of a nonconforming
structure, without the required -frontage would .be contrary to the
spirit and a major objective of the ordinance.
4.

Stabilization of Neighborhoods.

Mr• Johnson testified

as to the importance of comprehensive zoning, as it impacts upon
developing neighborhoods:

"Q.
[By Ms. Lever]
Now, are there objectives that are
contained with in the master plan that deal with
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attempting to stabilize existing developed neighborhoods?
"A.
Yes. That's one of our mandates at the moment, is
the preservation of a residential area and the enhancement of those residential areas.
The programs and
policies that we are using right now, and of course the
zoning ordinance through its nonconforming provisions,
assist the City in removing buildings, or encouraging
·the removal of buildings that do not conform to today's
standards.a (R-402)
This is another area that the court failed to address in its
finding that the variance requested would not affect the public
health, safety or welfare.

The testimony of the zoning officials

charged with planning for that very welfare indicates that the
opposite is true.
Other negative impacts of the variance, which were discussed
by Mr. Johnson but seem to have been ignored by the court, are:

(1) garbage collection (R-394, 398, 401); (2) density re9uirements (R-395-also 311-312); ,and {3)_parking _(R-408-409). _The
listing could continue, but the point is ___ that the court, in its-zeal to focus on one citizen, refused to recognize the public
interest as required by statute.

As Mr. Johnson testified:

"Q.
In your opinion, is there any harm done to the
master plan if this building is allowed and authorized
and legalized for dwelling purposes?
"A. Wel 1, it runs contrary to the whole goal of the
City's planning effort. One, the stabilization
enhancement of the residential areas.
Carries with it
all those negative characterizations that we are trying
to eliminate. The zoning ordinances of course are to
be equally administered, and .I think that in this case
if the -position was that this building would remain
(sic) (as) a City decision, then we should rethink that
overall goal for Salt Lake City and think in terms of
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not so much enhancement, but just strictly numbers of
rental dwelling units.

"Q. Is that contrary to the legislative mandate and
policies
• • • as you understand them to be implemented?

."A.. .Yes,

i t is."

(R-408-409)

· It is respectfully submitted that the record abundantly
supports the Board's denial of the variance.

This is true

whether viewed from the facts before the Board or those presented
de novo to the Court.
denial.

The Lower Court erred in not affirming the

It was a request unsupported by facts to demonstrate an

extremely unique special circumstance, or where strict zoning
enforcement would work an unreasonable hardship when balanced
against the public interest.
:':i.'

CONCLUSION

Appellant seeks a reversal from this Court of the error

of

the Lower Court in°conducting a trial de·novo-when,reviewing a
decision of the Board of Adjustment.

As a matter of law such

litigation must be reviewed by the courts in their l}.mited
appellate·~

jurisdiction merely to determine if the administrative

body did not abuse its discretion which is presumed valid.
Courts are not free to substitute their judgment unless the
evidence is devoid of reasonable support.
In so doing, the District Court also erred by failing to
afford the administrative decision with a presumption of validity
and by assuming the prerogative to substitute( its judgment for
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the Board's in reweighing and rebalancing the evidence before the
Board.
Inasmuch as the record clearly shows such reasonable support
for the Board's decision, Respondent failed to meet its burden to
show clear and convincing error, and therefore the Board's
decision should be affirmed.
DATED this

--~~

day of August, 1982.

JUDY F. LEVER
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
cc61
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r

BEFORE

THE

BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, SALT LAKE

CITY;

UTAH

FINDINGS AND ORDER, CASE NO. 7928
REPORT

OF THE

COMMISSION:

This is an appeal by Gary J. X~nthos for a variance to legalize a single-family
dwelling at 1610 West 900 South Street on a lot with a newly constructed duplex
which causes the dwelling to not have frontage on a dedicated street, without the
required side and rear yards, and without the required off-street parking in a Residential "R-2" District.
Gary Xanthos was present together.with Richard Rappaport of 66 Exchange Place. Also
present was Nona T. Cottle of 1616 West .,900 South. Mr. Jorgensen explained that the
single-family dwelling lo.cated on the rear p_ortion of the lot was evidently built
some time prior to 1927 and may have been a garage originally situated right on the
alley. If it was built prior .. to 1927 it was built before there was any zoning. In
1974 a permit was taken out for four duplexes plus carports. The plans indicated an
existing building on the lot but -it was not marked as a dwelling. In looking at the
plans, it was assumed . that. the building was an accessory building; but the building
inspectors should have noted the problem when inspecting the property. It would be
permissable to have an accessory building behind the duplexes but not a dwelling.
If it would have been known that it was a dwelling the duplexes would never have ·
been permitted to be constructed in front of it. Every building has to face on a
dedicated street. Even if a building is situated way in the back of the lot with
room for another dwelling, one could not be constructed in front of it,because it
would make either the building in the front illegal or the building in the rear illegal. Laura Landikusic presented the .original plans and permits which indicate no
dwelling on the lot at that time. The applic,arif who· filed for the permit stated
that the property was vacant. It was, also noted that the carports were not constructed in accordance with the. p]..ans the b.uiJ.,ding permit was issued on. The carports were to be detached directly off the alley but they are attached with the
rear area blacktopped instead "of landscaped. ,. Mr. Rappaport explained that James
Xanthos was the owner of the property at the time of. const.ruction but is now deceased. Mr. Rappaport stated that he understood that the building was a dwelling
at the time the duplexes were constructed.
further stated that the dwelling provides low-income housing and is necessary for the economic feasibility of the duplex
project. He further stated that he. doesn't know of any compla.ints. Mr. Rappaport
.explained that if the·deceased had known of the violation at the time he applied for
the permit he could have arranged a different plan but the property was:lnspected by
various inspectors and nothing was said. Mr. Rappaport feels that at the time of
construction there was no intention of violating the law; ·a proper perm~t was obtained.

He

Nona Cottle who owns the adjacent property stated that as far a.s she knows the house
was occupied when the duplexes were constructed but Mr. Xantbos did put in some new
wiring and put new siding on the house although he told her he wasn't supposed to.
She explained that the house has no foundation under it and was built from the inside out. She is not in opposition so much to the .house being there but to the present occupants. They bring in a lot of traffic and noise. The blacktopping of the
alley leading to the house was also discussed. It was brought out.-t:hat there are many older homes in the City that don't have foundations but the house should be inspected for other violations. Mr. Xanthos .stated that the tenant in the house could
be changed if that would make it more acceptable to Ms. Cottle. It was also noted
by the Board that there are some junk cars by the house that should be removed. Mr.
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Case No. 7928
Page 2Xanthos was informed that he is responsible for the tenants and so he is responsible
for getting the cars removed •. Later in the meeting the various aspects of the case
were reviewed. It was noted that certificates of occupancy were issued for the duplexes. The single-family dwelling has no rear yard and insufficient side yards.
There is no record of a modified plan being filed for the alterations from the original plans for the duplexes. These problems should have been caught when the duplexes were inspected. The violation was brought to the attention of Building· and
Housing from another department in the City. The small house has to be either removed or legalized. Al Blair explained that the building inspector usually doesn't
look at the permit, he refers to the plot plan. The Board felt that some of the
blacktop in the rear yard should be removed and landscaping installed. It was noted
that the carports are legal although they are not built in the configuration indicated
on the original plans.
From the evidence before it and after further consideration, it is the opinion of
the Board that the granting of the requested variance would be inimical to the best
interest of the district and contrary to the spirit and intent of the Zoning Ordinance since the Board could find no unusual condition attached to this property which
would deprive the owner of a substantial property right or use of his property, since
the building permit indicated that there were no dwellings on the property and since
no evidence was presented which would justify the requested variance.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the requested variance be denied and the violations
corrected within 30 days.
Action taken by the Board of Adjustment at its meeting held Monday, February 26, 1979.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 12th day of March, 1979.

/'

,· _,· ,, .

• ,·:---

...

i.....

Vice Chairman

. { ( , (_~(I'

/. // . ~

/

)feting Secretary · ..

.J
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10-9-12. Powers of board on appeal-Granting of and showing to be
entitled to varia.nce.-The board of adjustment shall have· the following
powers:
(1) To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged that there is error
in any orde~, requirement, decision or determination made by the administrative official in the enforcement of this article or of any ordinance
adopted pursuant thereto.
(2) To hear and decide special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance
upon which such board is required to pass under such ordinance.
(3) To authorize upon appeal such variance from the terms of the
ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where owing to
special conditions a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance
will result in unnecessary hardship; provided, that the spirit of the-ordi. nance shall be observed and substantial justice done. Before any variance
may be authorized, however, it shall be shown that:
(a) The variance will not substantially affect the comprehensive p1an
of zoning in the city and that adherence to the strict letter of the ordinance ·
will cause difficulties and hardships, the imposition of ·which upon the
petitioner is unnecessary in order to carry out the general purpose of the
plan.
(b) Special circumstances attached to the property covered by the
application which do not generally apply to the other property in the same
distric~
·
(c) That because of said special circumstances, property covered by
application is deprived of privileges possessed by other properties in the .
same district; and that the granting of the variance is essential to the
enjoyment of a substantial property right possessed by other property in
the ~me distric~

: : 10-9-15. Judicial · review of board's decision-Time limitation.-The
city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment
may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any court
of competent jurisdiction; provided, petition for such relief is presented
to the court within thirty days after the filing of such decision in the office
of the board.
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CAPPENDIX 5

ILED IN CLE;ll<'S OFFICE
RI chard A. Rappapor""t-------F Ga1t Lake C::.unt1, Utch
CXllNE, RAPPAPCmT ~ SEGAL

88 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah ·1411t
Telephones Uol) 531-2888
Attorney for Plaintiff

FEB 101382

IN 1HB DISTRlcr CX>ORT OF THB mtRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND PCB SALT LAKE OXJNTY, STATE OP Ul'AH

•••••••
GARY J. XANTR>S,

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
YI.

AMENDED
OP PACT
AND
CDfCLUS 1005 OP LAW
FINDIN~

)

BOARD OP ADJUSTMBNT
OF SALT LAKE CITY,

)
)
)
)

Defendant.

Civil No. C-79-2426

• •• • • ••
The

plaintiff

having

submitted

Findings

_of

Pact

and

Conclusions of Law, and the defendant having filed objections t~
the

same,

and

counsel

for

both

Honorable Kenneth Rlgtrup,

parties

having met

District Judge,

on

the

with

1st

the

day or

Pebruary, 1982, and the Court having determined to deny some of
the objections end to grant others,
M:>W,

the

THBREPCllB,

Court

makes

the

foll owl ng

Amended

Findings of Pact and Conclusions or Law.
PINDIN~

1.

That

tlie

zoning

OP PAf:r

ordinances

of

Salt

Lake Cl ty

were

,adopted In September of 1921.
2.
'ment

Vern Jorgensen, Director of Planning and Zoning Depart-

of, Salt Lake City,

at

the Board of Adjustments

hearing

stated that· the building had been there prior to 1927, the date
of

enactm"nt

of

Salt

Lake ~lty

zonl ng

ordl nancea.

This

Is

reflected In the Board of Adjustment minutes.

s.

The structure In question at 1810 West 900 South, SaJ t

Lake City, Utah, was definitely In existence on April 21, 1942,
and at

that

time

It

was

occupted

by a

tenant

and

It

had

a

weathered appearance and an appearance of. being an old bul ldlng.
4.

Since at least April 21,

1942 1

the building

h~s

been

occupied and.used· aa a dwelling by a large number of tenants.

110
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5.

The

continued

existence

of

the

dwelling,

does

not

violate any safetJ requirements, nor does It Impair access, nor
does

adverselJ affect

It

the health,

safety or morals of

thE

citizens of Salt Lake City.
8.

That

to

comply with

the

decision

of

the Board

of

Adjustment and terms of the ordl nances, the bul ldl ng would have
to be el ther removed or used as storage or other aux I 11 ary use
requiring the elimination of Its use as a dwelling.
or

changes

to comply with strict

Such removal

enforcement serve no

pu~llc

Interest In this case.
7.

The proposed solutions of removal or change In use woul<

eliminate a dwelling which Is clearly habitable and which has an<
Is being put to valuable use.

I.

The

solutions

of

accessory or

aux I llary use

Improvements

or

modifying
or

enhancement

the

building

demo II tlon would
of

safety

to

result

requirements

some
In

nc

traffic

circulation, air space, or the health, safety or morals of thE
conmun I ty.
9.

The

gross

square

footage

of

the

property

woul~

accomodate based upon minimum area requirements four duplexes an~
a

family dwelling

If

configuration •nd design

single

on

However,

properly designed.
the

subject

property

are

the

not

sc

properly deal gned or arranged, and _there fore exceed the ml n I mun
.!'

requirements and lack yard areas required under ordinance.
10.

There Is In Salt Lake City a shortage of low lncomE

housing and the elimination of this dwelling which provh!es lo•
cost housing Is Inconsistent with the public need and Interest.
11.
tenant

Elimination of this unit would cause a hardship toe
who

would

be

deprived

of

a

habitable

dwelling

at

e

relatively low cost of $150.00 per month.
12.

Elimination of the unit also creates an economic hard-

ship for the plaintiff In this action by Imposing an unnecessar)
loss of $150.00 per month.
13.
not

Continuation of the use as a ·dwelling In this case wllJ

substantially affect

the

comprehensive plan of Salt LakE

2

:!.1.1.
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c

(,

City.

Whereas. strict enforcement wlll cause unnecessary hardship

for tenant and owner, .without furthering the general plan.
14.

The granting of the variance Is essential to the pro-

perty owner to enjoy substantial property rights enjoyed by other
property owners.
15.

The plat submitted as part of the original building

&~plication

for four duplexes by the plaintiff's deceased father,

-James Xanthos, showed that there
site.

wa~

an existing building on the

The application Indicated that there was no dwelling or

the site.

The application did not Indicate any accessory build·

lngs on the site.
16.
Planning
There

The original plans

filed by James Xanthos with thf

and Zoning Department

were

other

cannot

deficiencies

In

be

the

found
City

by

the- Cl ty.

record

keepln(

pertaining to the building and Its occupancy.

IT.

City building Inspectors went to the site at least flv•

times during the' course of construction.

The structure was ob·

servable

the

to

the

Inspectors,

and

one

of

city

Inspectors

Marvin Pegu 111!'-n, observed the building and I nqul red about It bu·
none

of

the

Inspectors

followed

through

with

removing

th•

building frcm use or availability for use as a dwelling.
18.

The City Issued certificates of occupancy for the fou

duplexes.

There_... was no evl dence or record of any .conmunl cate•

conditions or stipulations restricting or concerning the use o
removal of the structure as a single family dwelling.
· 19.

Although

the

application made

no· reference

to

th

aJngle family dwelling, the Inclusion of the building on the pla
plan was sufficient disclosure by the applicant to place the Cit
on reasonable notice to make further Jl'lqulry about the exlstenc
and use of the building.
20.
variance

The Board of Adjustment erred In fa 111 ng to grant
In

accordance with

thats

(a)

public

Interests

the

provisions

of

10-9-12(3)

the variance In this case Is not contrary to th
(b)

there are special condl tlons which wll

result In unnecessary hardship 'If· there Is a 11 teral enforcemen

3
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of the provisions of the ordlnancei and (c)

In light of the fac

that the spirit of the ordinance has been observed and there ha
been substantial justice done.
There

21.

are

special

circumstances

attached

to

th

property covered by the application wh'lch do not generally appl
to

other

properties

In

the

same

district

Including,

but

no

limited to1

(a)

the age and occupancy of the dwelling; (b)

th

approval

the

City of

th·

by

~f

Issuance of certificates
(c)

the

the development

of

the

duplexes

occupancy for the duplexes1 and

failure of the City to Inform James Xanthos

that

th•

dwelling would not comply with zoning ordinances thereby falllnt
to

give

him

the

opportunity

to

redesign

the

layout

for

t~

duplexes In such a way as not to require the demolition of th•
dwelling.
22.

The Imposition of the strict enforcement of the zonlnf

ordinances upon the petl ti oner Is unnecessary In order to carr!
out

the

general

purpose of

the zoning plans and comprehenshf

plan In the city.
CXlNCLUSIONS OP LAW
1.

The Board of Adjustment wrongfully, arbitrarily, capri-

ciously and unreasonably fal led to grant the var lance requestec
by the

plalntl~f

2.

herein.

The variance should have been granted pursuant

pr.ovlsl ons of Sec ti on

10-9-12(3), Utah Code Annotated,

to thE
1953 as

amended.
3.

The

provisions

person aggrieved of a

of Section

decision of

maintain a plenary action for relief
4.

10-9-15

provide

that

any

th' Board of Adjustment may
therefrom~

This court has jurisdiction with respect to such plenary

action for relief.
5 •.

Plenary action relief constitutes a complete review of

the Board of Adjustment's decision by trial de novo and the court
bas

the

same

power

as

the Board of Adjustments

to

review the

facts.

4
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c
I.

c

The Board of Adjustment's decision was contrary to t,.e

evidence In the case and pla Intl ff

la entl tied

to the var I ance

requested as a matter of law and equity.
T.

There

demolition of

no

ls

the

public

subject

Interest

building

or

served
Its

In

requiring

conversion

the

Into ar

accessory building.
11.

The

failure

to

grant

the

variance

Is

arbitrary,
•/'

capricious and unreasonable and contrary to the heal th,

safet)

and morals of Salt La1;\ City and Its citizens.

I

DATED this

1 -day of February, 1982.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned

hereby certifies

that a

true

and

correc

copy of the foregoing Amended Findings of Pact and Conclusions o
Law was malled,

post~ge

prepaid, on the

~~-(_b_

day of February

1982, to Judy _P. Lever, Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, Cit
and County Building, Salt Lake

,.

5
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